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IU THE SUPREHE COURT
OF THE STn.TE OF UTAH

"!ARY J.

~1ACKEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
~ICHARD

Case No. 14619

L. HARVEY,

Defendant-~espondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLAHT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for personal injury and to property resulting from an automobile accident.
DISPOSITIOH IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury who found the issues
in favor of the respondent and against the appellant, no cause
of action.

~ppellant

moved for a new trial which the court

denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment
in her favor as a matter of laN on the issue of liability and
a new trial on the issue of damages, or if that fails, a new
trial on all issues of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and respondent were operating automobiles
which collided at the intersection of 3300 South and 700 East
Streets in Salt Lake County, at approximately 11:20 a.m. on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

June lS, 197J.

Traffic at the intersection was controlled by

an electric semaphore signal with a green arrow turning signal
for the 3300 South traffic.

Appellant was traveling east on

3300 South, which has two through lanes going east and a leftturn storage lane for traffic turning north onto 700 East.

Ap-

pellant observed the green turn arrow as she approached the leftturn storage lane and proceeded slowly into the intersection to
make a left turn, where she was struck by the respondent.
ponde~t

Res-

was traveling south on 700 East in the center lane which

has three through lanes for the traffic going south with a leftturn storage lane for the traffic turning east onto 3300 South.
As he ap?roached the commencement of the left-turn storage lane,
respondent observed the green light in his favor but did not look
at it again and proceeded into the intersection where he struck
the left-front of the appellant's vehicle.
extremely busy with a heavy flow of traffic.

The intersection is
The traffic was

stopped and backed up on 3300 South proceeding east and west.
There also was traffic proceeding west on 3300 South and turning
south onto 700 East or going the opposite direction than the appellant.

There also was traffic stopped on 700 East facing north

waiting to turn west onto 3300 South.
ARGU11ENT
POINT I
INSTRUCTIO'l NO. 15 l'IAS SUB?1ITTED AND RECEIVED IN VIOLATION OF THE
RULES OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF UTAH.
The trial of this matter commenced on the 31st day of
March, 1976, and at the end of the second day, being April 1,
1976, all evidence was in and both the appellant and respondent
rested.

(T. 24)

On the morning of April 2nd, which was the
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ti~e set for oral argu~ent,

tion ~o. 15 to the court.

the respondent submitted InstrucAppellant took exception to it as

to its contents and also that it was not timely filed with the
court, but the court, contrary to Rules of Practice in the
District Courts of the State of Utah, Adopted by order of the
Judicial Council on September 15, 1975, and effective January
1, 1976, submitted the instruction to the jury.
Rule 5.4 Requests for Instructions provides:
Requests for instructions shall
be presented to court at the commencement of the trial, provided, that additional or further instructions may be
presented not later than the close of
evidence. At the time of presenting
requests, a copy of the same shall be
furnished to opposing counsel.
Respondent's Requested Instructions are dated the
31st day of
19.

~arch,

1976, and contained instructions 1 through

No. 20, which was the court's No. 15, was submitted later

as stated above.

(T. 65-85)

This rule was established pursuant to the authority
vested in the Judicial Council of the State of Utah by Section
78-3-21(3) (a) which provides:
Establish general policies for the
operation of the courts including
uniform rules and forms for practice
and procedure, consistent with la~1
and the provisions of this act.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 15 TO 'l'HE JURY.
Instruction No. 15,

1~hich

the appellant takes excep-

tion to, provides:
You are instructed that even though the operator
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of an auto~obile has the right-of-way, he still has the duty
to keep and to maintain a reasonable, proper, and adequate
lookout and to use reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a
collision.
One who has the right-of-way must use due care
while crossing and must continue to keep a reasonable lookout and reappraise the situation as he approaches an intersection and use reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid a collision as he proceeds.
There is imposed upon a driver the duty to be aware
of the relative positions and speeds of vehicles approachinq and he must recurrently reobserve and reappraise in
the light of the consistent changing conditions of a fluid
traffic situation.
Therefore, even if you should find
from the evidence in this case that either driver had the
technical right-of-way, you should also consider that such
right-of-way is a relative right only, and if he was careless in failing to keep and continue to keep a reasonable
and adequate lookout or fail to exercise reasonable and
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid a collision
and that such negligence, if any, proximately contributed
in any substantial degree to cause the collision, he would
be negligent.
The importance of this instruction and the weight the jury
put on it is apparent since they returned a verdict of no cause of
action, which undoubtedly was based on an interpretation of what constituted reasonable care or a proper lookout.
Appellant contends that the instruction nullifies the reasonable care standard, for it imposes an absolute duty to be aware
of other vehicles instead of a duty of reasonable care and is tantamount to a direct verdict against the appellant.

The instruction

takes the position that an intersection collision will not occur
unless both drivers are negligent and fail to see each other.
This was the position taken by the defendant in the case
of Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952).

The

Martin case involved a collision at an open intersection where
plaintiff had the right of way.

The trial court refused to per-

mit plaintiff's case to go to the jury on the theory that plaintiff had a duty as a matter of law to see defendant's automobile
approaching
his
failure
to
seeby thethe
defendant's
vehicle
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sooner than he did was negligence as a matter of law.

On ap-

peal the defendant contended that an open intersection collision will not occur unless both drivers are negligent and fail
to see each other.

The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the

contention that plaintiff had an absolute duty to see defendant's vehicle.
Although plaintiff had the right of way under both
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon
him the duty of due care in observing for other
traffic.
But in doing so he had the right to assume, and to rely and act on the assumption that
others would do likewise; he was not obliged to anticipate either that other drivers would drive negligently, nor fail to accord him his right of way,
until in the exercise of due care, he observed, or
should have observed, something to warn him that
the other driver was driving negligently or would
fail to accord him his right of way.
If this principle is not clear in the earlier Utah cases, it is
firmly established by the more recent expressions
of this court.
Also in the case of Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60,

163 P.2d 510, the plaintiff was traveling on an arterial highway and the defendant's ambulance approached from a cross street
and ran a stop sign.
~rere

The court instructed that both parties

negligent as a matter of law while the issue of proximate

cause was submitted to the jury and a verdict for plaintiff
was sustained on appeal.

The court, in holding that plaintiff

was not negligent as a matter of law in not looking for traffic
approaching the arterial highway, stated:
In the first olace, the trial court was distinctly
in error in i~structing the jury that the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence as a mat~er of law . . .
The (trial] court may have been m1sled by our case
of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350. But
the facts of that case were far different from those
in this case.
In that case there was no stop sign-no designation of arterial highway
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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He 1-1as on an a.rt."rial.
He could rely on the ambulance stopping before he reached the intersection until he was or should have been definitely
aware that it was not going to do so. At that time
he may have been well out in the intersection. Only
at that point did his duty to stop or accelerate
his speed--viz. attempt to avoid the accident,
begin.
Where a motorist has the right of way because he is
proceeding with a green light, as is the situation in the case
before the court, t~e right to assume non-negligence distinguishes
the lookout duty from the ordinary open intersection cases.

(See

Hess v. Robinson, supra; Youngblood v. Robison, 239 La. 330, 118
So.2d 1431, annotation at 2 ALR 3rd 12.)
Instruction 15 was taken from the case of Badger v.
Clayson, 18 Utah 2d 329, 422 P.2d 665.

This was a collision at

the intersection of 1300 East 4500 South, both being residential
streets, and it. was admitted by both parties that they were
familiar wi. :::, the! intersection and that it was a blind intersection.

The defendant entered the intersection on a yellow light and

was in the intersection on a red light when the plaintiff, traveling
on the green light, collided with the defendant.

The court, in

taking the position that the hazardous intersection might well
demand a higher duty of care, stated:
. . there is plausibility to the idea that due to the
special hazard in approaching a blind intersection, the
standard of reasonable care might well demand special
caution to be alert for oncoming traffic; . . . There
seems to be no harm in such an instruction in the ordinary intersection case, and could be under the circumstances here where the plaintiff knew the intersection
was very dangerous, did not slow down, conceded that he
did not look, and entered the intersection after the
defendant had entered it, but here the intersection was
unusual where neither driver could see the other coming
until he got to or in the intersection. Both of the
drivers knew of the dangerous and hazardous nature of
this particular "blind" intersection,--and both, knowing of this, \-lith the split-minute change in mechanical
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
semaphoreLibrary
signals,
may have had a duty to slow down
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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below the posted speed limits.

Neither did.

Appellant submits that there are three main distinctions between the Badger case and the principal case.
1.

The accident took place on a residential street

where there is less traffic and distraction for a driver to be
aware of.
2.

Both drivers knew of the hazardous, blind inter-

section and should have taken extra caution.
3.

Defendant was in the intersection and plaintiff,

failing to keep a proper lookout and observe whether the intersection was clear, struck the defendant.
The case before the court involves an intersection of
two major arterial highways where traffic is thick and backed
up waiting for lights to change and even other traffic in the
intersection making left-hand turns opposite to the appellant.
Appellant approached the intersection in a cautious manner,
observing the light in her favor and other traffic in the intersection.

She was in the intersection and traveling at a slow

rate of speed while making her left-hand turn and was struck by
the respondent.
I refer the court to the holding in the case of
Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884, that was upheld in Larson v. Evans, 12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088, where
the court held:
A traveler approaching a signal-controlled
intersection with the light in her favor has the
right of way and can rely on it until something
appears to indicate it is not safe to do so.
Instruction 15 places too great of a burden on a
driver
inQuinney
an Law
intersection
of this
type
because
becomes
Sponsored
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impossible for a reasonable driver to observe every happening
in a busy arterial intersection.
POINT III
THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, AND IF THE APPELLANT
FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT, IT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Appellant's testimony was that as she approached the
intersection, she saw the left-turn green arrow come on in her
favor as she was about to enter the left-turn storage lane.
(R. 3, 9)

She continued very slowly as it was her intent to

make a left-hand turn.

(R. 5, 11)

She noticed other traffic

in the intersection proceeding west to make a left turn south
onto 700 East.

Also, cars were backed up on 3300 South waiting

for the light, to proceed east through the intersection.

(R.

4)

In regard to the respondent's vehicle, on cross-examination, appellant stated that she did not remember seeing anything that \vas close enough to hit her.
on direct examination was:

(R. 11)

Her testimony

"It was somewhere on my immediate

left, but I don't know how far it was away."

(R.

5)

Respondent testified that he was traveling in the
center lane and that he looked at the light as he approached the
left-turn storage lane and it was green in his favor.
stated:

He then

"I didn't think I had any trouble making it through, so

I just kept on proceeding like I was."
Harold P.

~1cEwan

(R.

30)

was an eye witness to the accident

and he was on 700 East stopped in the left-turn lane.

He stated

that the lights were red for all northbound traffic on 700 East
and he assumed that they would be the same for all southbound
(R. 14, 17)
He observed a car proceeding
traffic
on 700 East.
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west on 3300 South, making a left-hand turn in front of him to
go south on 700 East and a Chevrolet, driven by Miss Mackey,
entered the intersection to make a left turn to go north on
700 East.

He then observed the Harvey vehicle enter the inter-

section and immediately looked and the light was still red and
the through traffic to go east and west had not started yet.
Then the respondent ran into the appellant.

(R.

15)

Deputy Ernest Clough investigated the accident and
when he was asked whether he made a determination as to what
happened, he indicated that the Hackey vehicle had pulled into
the intersection to make a left turn onto 700 East and the
Harvey vehicle southbound on 700 East went through a red light
crashing into the side of the

~ackey

car.

(R.

22)

Deputy Clough further testified that the 3300 South
intersection is 49 feet wide and the left-front of respondent's
vehicle was 17 feet 3 inches into the intersection and he
skidded approximately 33 feet to point of impact and moved
4 feet 20 inches after impact.

(R. 22-23)

It appears that appellant was denied recovery on the
jury's finding that she was negligent in failing to keep a
proper lookout and that such was the proximate cause of the
accident.

It is alleged under Point II that the jury was

erroneously instructed with respect to the appellant's duty to
maintain a lookout.

However, in any event, a failure to main-

tain a proper lookout by the appellant could not have been a
proximate cause of the collision.
It must be assumed that appellant entered the intersection on the green semaphore at a reasonable rate of speed
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization
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the Institute of Museum
Library
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maintain the lookout which the court required under its instructions to the jury.

It is submitted that a lack of diligence to

maintain a lookout could not possibly have been the proximate
cause of the accident.
The courts have held that failure to keep a proper
lookout is not the proximate cause of an accident unless the
driver, by maintaining a proper lookout, could have avoided the
accident.

See Morris v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 140, 356 P.2d 34.

In the Morris case the plaintiff was proceeding through an
intersection on a green light and failed to see the
defendant's automobile approaching on the cross street
until just before the impact.
On appeal the Supreme
Court held that the trial judge had reasonably and
property concluded that plaintiff's observation of
approaching traffic would not have forewarned him of
the impending hazard and that a failure to keep a
proper lookout under such circumstances was not a
proximate cause of the collision.
In so holding the
court enunciated the rule of proximate cause which
applies to the facts of the case at bar:
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and to see
what there is to see so as to be able to exercise
ordinary precaution to prevent collisions such as
this. This duty extends to the favore0 driver with
the right of way as well as to t~e disfavored driver.
But he who has the right of way need not anticipate
sudden outbursts of negligence on the part of another
driver.
Indeed, it may be said that the failure to
observe is negligence proximately contributing to
the harm only where by observing the driver could
have avoided or lessened the resulting harm.
(Emphasis added.)"
In the case at the bar appellant had no opportunity to
avoid the collision, for she stated that she didn't remember
seeing anything that was close enough to hit her until the respondent was upon her while she was in the intersection.

The

reason she did not see him was because the respondent was not
within the immediate proximity to be seen and to cause the
appellant to be aware of an existing danger.
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T~e

record does not say the speed of the vehicles.

However, it does indicate that the appellant was going at a
very slow rate of speed, and in fact, counsel attempted under
cross-examination to show to the jury that at the very slow rate
of speed which the appellant was going, she could have avoided
the accident.
The only information we have as to the respondent's
speed was that he skidded approximately 33 feet and moved 4 feet
and 20 inches after impact.

The movement after impact would in-

dicate that he was traveling way in excess of 25 miles per hour
for the stopping distance at that speed would be 32 feet.
The court can take judicial notice of how various
rates of speed might have affected the accident and by simple
mathematical calculations, it is readily ascertainable that if
the appellant had failed to keep a proper lookout, it would
not have been the proximate cause of the accident.
Benson v. D.

&

R. G.

~\T.

(See

R., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790; l'lalker v.

Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P. 2d 291)
If the appellant's speed were 15 miles per hour, then
she would have been traveling at the rate of 22 feet per second.
If the respondent's speed were 35 miles per hour, then he would
have been traveling at the rate of 51 feet per second.

Three

seconds before the accident the appellant would have been 66
feet from the point of impact while the respondent would have
been 153 feet from the point of impact, a distance that would
not have caused any alarm to a reasonable person.
Two seconds before the accident, the appellant would
have been 44 feet from point of impact and the respondent
would
been
102 Funding
feetfor digitization
from the
of of impact,
a distance
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that would have still not alerted a reasonable person.
At one second before the accident, the appellant would
have been 22 feet from the point of impact or approximately 5
feet from the commencement of the intersection, while the respondent 1~ould have been 51 feet from the point of i~pact or approximately 34 feet from the commencement of the intersection.
(Deputy Clough testified that respondent was 17 feet 3 inches
in the intersection.

[R. 23])

Even at that distance, a reason-

able person could assume that the respondent would bring his
vehicle to a stop in view of the semaphore and busy intersection.
Even if the appellant had seen the respondent at this point, she
could not have avoided the accident because she would have
traveled 17 feet, being the reaction time to apply her brake and
an additional 12 feet before she could bring her vehicle to a
stop, which would have placed her right in the path of the oncoming respondent.
This is looking at it in the light most favorable to
the respondent, because no allowance is being made for the fact
that he was braking his car, which would mean that he was actually back a farther distance in each situation than stated.
Also, if respondent were going at a faster rate of speed, he
would have been back still farther, making it more unreasonable
for the appellant to have seen him.
The appellant, having the light in her favor and
having the responsibility to observe the other traffic in the
intersection, had the right to assume that respondent would
yield the right of way until in

t~e

exercise of due care,

appellant should have known to the contrary.

Thus, appellant,
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~ine that respondent,

in view of his speed and approach, was

not going to yield the right of way, whereupon appellant \<Tould
first become obligated to take evasive action.

It is obvious

that she did not have an opportunity to apply her brakes or
turn her vehicle a split second before the collision.
I refer the court to the concurring opinion of Justice
Woolf in the case of Hartin v. Stevens, supra, where he is discussing the case of Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d
514, wherein he states:
Perhaps in the Hickok case, a reappraisement of the situation if it had been made at
the right moment would have alerted the favored
driver to the fact that the disfavored driver
was not going to yield the right of way and
perhaps given him time to avoid the collision.
I say "at the right moment" because a moment
sooner than that "right moment" the driver of
the favored car might still have thought the other
driver \'/ould slow down to let him pass whilst a
moment later than that "right moment" it would
have been too late to avoid the collision. This
points up, I think, the duty we put upon the favored
driver in those cases. The disfavored driver has
the duty to slow down; and while the favored
driver cannot totally igr,ore the other and blindly
traverse the intersection, he can, until he is
otherwise put on notice, presume that the disfavored driver will slow down and permit him to
pass, .
It is submitted that at the time the appellant first
had an opportunity to observe the respondent's vehicle, there
was nothing appellant could do to avoid the accident and that
the failure to keep a proper lookout was not the proximate
cause of the accident.
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits that the rules of
the district courts have been adopted pursuant to statute and
have the force and effect of law, that they are fair for both
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parties and should be upheld by the Supreme Court.

If they are

not upheld, then there is no reason to have the rules and they
should be abolished or they will be abused and broken by all
parties.
Instruction No. 15 was prejudicial in that it placed
too great of a burden on the appellant in the fact situation of
this case and was tantamount to a directed verdict on the lookout question.

Even if the appellant had failed to keep a

proper lookout, the evidence is overwhelming in her favor that
her negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident.
Respectfully submitted

Homer F. W1lk1nson
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two copies
of the foregoinq to Henrv E. Heath, Attorney for DefendantRespondent at Stronq & Hanni, 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 8th day of April, 1977.

Homer F. W1lk1nson
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